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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

FROM EXCEPTION TO NORM:
DEACCESSIONING IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICAN ART MUSEUMS
Throughout their history in America, museums, including those of art, have adapted
according to their environment. One result of this adaptability is that objects in art
museum collections are not as permanent as those outside the museum field tend to
believe. As scholarship, funding, and audiences change, objects which at one time were
considered pertinent to a museum collection may be deaccessioned, the term used for
when a museum removes an accessioned object from its permanent collection. Yet
deaccessioning in America tended to remain the exception, rather than the rule, until the
last three decades of the twentieth century. How deaccessioning became a normal
element of collections management in the late twentieth century can be understood as a
consequence of a number of factors, including a change in the institutional and economic
climate in which art museums operated. Examining some of the factors leading to the
normalization of deaccessioning, at least for those in the museum community, can help us
better understand the implications of such a shift.
KEYWORDS: Deaccession, History of American Museums, Public Accountability, Art
Market, Collections Management Policy
Multimedia Elements Used: JPEG (jpg)
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I. Introduction
In 1972, in an editorial criticizing the deaccessions and sales of important works
from the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s collection, art critic John Canaday declared,
Art museums are neither merchandise marts nor esthetic stock exchanges. They are
repositories of precious records. Nothing worth buying or accepting, as a gift in the first
place ever becomes less than part of the record of a phase of our culture, even if it also
represents a curatorial idiocy. In spite of every exception, the rule is that selling from the
collection is hazardous policy, and often unethical policy.1

Canaday’s view that art museums should never sell from the collection greatly contrasts
with that of Glenn Lowry, the current director of the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA).
Thirty years after Canaday wrote his editorial, in 2005 Lowry stated the museum’s view
on deaccessioning and selling:
…the inaugural gift was given to us [MoMA] with the understanding that we would sell
from that collection to buy more significant and important works of art. We always
understood, from that moment on, that we had a double responsibility – to build a
collection and refine the collection, which meant that when we do accept gifts, they’re
always unconditional, for a reason.2

Lowry reiterated his point in a 2007 interview: “It is by selling to get an even more
important work that we became and are the most important museum of contemporary art
in the world.”3
The opinion expressed by Canady reveals that in 1972, the deaccession and
disposal of artworks was still enough of an exception that the Metropolitan Museum’s
actions created a public “scandal.” Ultimately, the protest over the deaccessions led to
government hearings and the museum agreeing to implement strict written deaccession
policies. This is in stark contrast to Lowry’s open acknowledgment that deaccessioning
and selling artworks from the collection is an integral component in the building and
refinement of MoMA’s collection. These two vastly different opinions raise the question
of how and why did deaccessioning, the process of legally removing an accessioned

1

John Canaday, "Very Quiet and Very Dangerous," New York Times, Feb. 27 1972.
Adam Lindemann, Collecting Contemporary (Köln, London, 2006), 265.
3
Louise Nicholson, “Modern Master: Interview with Glenn Lowry,” Apollo 2007, 27.
2
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object from a museum collection, become a part of normal museum operating procedures
in America, rather than an exception, in the span of only thirty years?4 With this question
in mind, I will present an argument that in the late twentieth century, American art
museums institutionalized deaccessioning as a normal practice as a consequence of
significant changes in the institutional and economic environment, including a decrease
in government funding, tax restrictions on gifts to art museums, and increasing
expectation of public accountability. These and other factors created a need for art
museums to modify their institutional behavior in order to survive and thrive in a more
competitive market. The establishment of official policies and procedures for regulating
but also normalizing deaccessions was part and parcel of that process.
Museums in America have shown themselves to be adaptable institutions. As
audiences, founders, and scholarship changed, museums have changed in response.
Museums were first established in America during the early nineteenth century as forprofit enterprises, which often emphasized entertainment over education. Later in the
century, wealthy supporters intent on improving the aesthetic taste of the general
populace, as well as increasing the cultural standing of their cities, began acquiring and
donating everything they could in order to establish both industrial and fine art museums.
After the initial flurry of acquisitions, American art museums gradually began to favor
quality over quantity, partially as a result of an increasing emphasis on artistic originality.
It is at this point that deaccessioning in American art museums truly begins. Art
museums’ curators and boards became more selective in what they brought in, as well as
what they kept. As a result, “less important” objects began to be deaccessioned from
collections.
As an established practice, however, deaccessioning did not come into its own
until the last three decades of the twentieth century. Deaccessions before this were
generally not regulated, and usually practiced at the discretion of a museum. However, as
government funding for arts organizations and art museums increased during the 1960s
and 1970s, so did the expectation of public accountability on the part of art museums.
4

Additionally, deaccessioning does not affect a museum’s ownership of an object. According to the
Association of American Museums, museums can dispose of deaccessioned objects in a variety of ways: an
object can be kept in a study collection, given to another museum that might make more use of it, thrown
out (although this rarely happens), or sold at auction. “Peer Review Manual: Glossary,” American
Association of Museums, http://www.aam-us.org/getinvolved/pr/upload/F8_Glossary.pdf. F8-F9.
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When the Metropolitan Museum deaccessioned important works in 1972 from its
collections to raise acquisition funds, deaccessioning as a practice was publicly and
widely discussed for the first time. The scandal over the Metropolitan Museum
deaccessions centered on the fact that the museum attempted, and somewhat succeeded,
to sell important works rather than items of lesser value. Many critics, including
Canaday, felt that the deaccessions revealed a failure in the trusteeship invested in the
Metropolitan Museum to guard the public patrimony of America.
The issue of accountability was raised once again when another upsurge of
deaccessions of important works occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s. At this point in
time, museums were adapting their approaches to collection management as a
consequence of decreased government funding, a detrimental tax reform act, and a
booming art market. These factors created a newly competitive market in which
American art museums had to change their operating procedures in order to thrive and, in
some instances, to survive. Some art museums chose to redefine themselves through the
vehicle of their mission statements in order to either exploit under-utilized market niches,
while others emphasized their current standing within a respective market niche. 5 As
mission statements were re-crafted, collections were likewise being re-shaped to be more
fully integrated with either existing or new goals established by an art museum. This
resulted in art museums feeling justified in selling great works if they did not ‘fit’ the
purview of their missions. These refinements were guided by collections policies, which
allowed for a methodical approach to deaccessioning. Collections policies also provided
proof that when an art museum deaccessions, it followed ethical policies approved by
professional museum organizations. By instituting official procedures, art museums and
their respective museum associations made deaccessioning into a permanent and normal
aspect of museum culture.

5

This is also the same time when blockbuster exhibitions became standard practice, with which art
museums could attract huge numbers and gain a large profit. See Gary Tinterow’s essay, “The Blockbuster,
Art History, and the Public: The Case of Origins of Impressionism,” in The Two Art Histories: The Museum
and the University, ed. Charles W. Hauxthausen (Williamstown, Mass: Sterling and Francine Clark Art
Institute, 2002), 142-153.
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II. Adaptive American Art Museums
Originally, museums in America were founded as for-profit enterprises by private
individuals. The national government has had no hand in establishing museums of any
sort, with the exception of the National Gallery. In the years after the Revolutionary War,
the early Republican government repeatedly refused to fund museums.6 As a result, the
first museums in America were established by entrepreneurial individuals for a number of
reasons. Motives for the establishment of museums in early America ranged from a
republican desire to educate to profit from credulous crowds willing to pay a coin to see
“natural wonders.” As popular taste and scholarship changed through time, so did these
museums. Without interested audiences or benefactors, it proved difficult for museums to
thrive. This resulted in museums willing to transform themselves and their collections in
order to be more relevant and, hopefully, to keep their doors open. It is perhaps this
historically adaptive quality that has led American art museums in the late twentieth
century to change their business practices in response to an increasingly competitive
environment.
Competition in Nineteenth Century America: The Early American Museum
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century America, public museums first began
as democratic arenas in which the natural world could be displayed for the edification of
all. The hope was that by learning about nature, man could learn his place in Creation and
therefore learn to “respect and honor truth and virtue, for what were truth and virtue but
distillations of divine wisdom?”7 The first American museum founded upon these
Enlightenment ideals belonged to Charles Willson Peale, who began his endeavor in
Philadelphia in 1784.8 With his Philadelphia Museum, Peale hoped to achieve two main
goals. The first was to teach natural science, with a dabbling of art and some history. To
realize the first aim, Peale arranged the objects in his museum hierarchically, with
portraits of famous and contemporary figures at top, stuffed specimens of known animals
in the middle, and unknown species and fossil remains at the bottom. In this way, the
6

Ruth Helm, “Peale’s Museum: Politics, Idealism, and Public Patronage in the Early Republic,” in
Mermaids, Mummies, and Mastodons: The Emergence of the American Museum, ed. William T. Alderson
(Washington, D.C.: American Association of Museums, 1992), 70.
7
Neil Harris, Humbug: The Art of P.T. Barnum, [1st]. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 33-34.
8
Ibid.
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natural world was arranged from highest to lowest, with humans representing the peak of
creation.9
Yet Peale, for all his enthusiasm for republican ideals, was also a business man
who relied on the profits from admissions to support himself and his family. In order to
attract greater crowds to his museum, Peale displayed exhibits he termed, “rational
amusements.”10 These “rational amusements,” consisting of entertaining but educational
activities, were used as a way to attract common people who would be willing to pay a
twenty-five cent admission fee to experience Peale’s offerings:
…magic mirrors that distorted a viewer into a giant, a dwarf, or a monster with seven heads; a
speaking tube mounted in a lion’s head that allowed one to shout back and forth with one’s friends
in another room; a phsiognotrace that would sketch one’s silhouette; a pipe organ of eight stops
that talented visitors might play; an electrical machine that gave those who touched its extension a
11
moderate shock; and a compound blowpipe to demonstrate the wonders of chemistry.

Peale realized that in order to draw people into his museum, his exhibits needed to be
actively engaging. In this way, audiences would be intrigued enough hopefully to learn
more about what they were experiencing, or if nothing else, at least have their curiosity
aroused.
With its intent on educating citizens, Peale viewed his museum as an institution
worthy of federal and state funding, stating that since museums are “for a public benefit,
[they] should be a public charge.”12 However, both George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson turned a deaf ear to his appeals, regarding museums as private concerns and as
such, should be privately funded.13 Peale also campaigned for financial support from both
the Pennsylvania Legislature and the Philadelphia civic government. Although he was
somewhat more successful at receiving funds at the state and local level, Peale’s museum
was never taken on as a government-supported institution.14
9

Steven Conn, Museums and American Intellectual Life, 1876-1926 (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1998), 35.
10
Edward P. Alexander, “Mermaids, Mummies, and Mastodons: An Exhibition on the Evolution of Early
American Museums,” in Mermaids, Mummies, and Mastodons: The Emergence of the American Museum,
ed. William T. Alderson (Washington, D.C.: American Association of Museums, 1992), 19.
11
Ibid.
12
Charles Willson Peale to John Hawkins, 3 March 1807, Peale-Sellers Papers. Cited in Helm, “Peale’s
Museum: Politics, Idealism, and Public Patronage in the Early Republic,” 69.
13
Helm, “Peale’s Museum: Politics, Idealism, and Public Patronage in the Early Republic,” 70.
14
Helm sees Peale’s failure to receive full federal, state or local support as a result of the obsoleteness of
his argument: “While Peale insisted that the museum would admirably serve republicanism by educating
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As a result of the lack of government funding, by the 1830s and 1840s, Peale and
his sons, Rubens and Rembrandt, increasingly relied on amusements such as gas lighting
at night and exotic curios to attract crowds.15 The need to increase attendance was a
consequence of the growing competition presented by similar natural history museums,
as well as theaters and circuses. 16 Hucksters like P.T. Barnum quickly took advantage of
the lucrative opportunities presented by natural “curiosities” by presenting to the
credulous public bizarre and strange exhibits. To appear more legitimate, these purveyors
of the fantastic applied the name ‘museum’ to their collections of offerings. For example,
in New York City, Scudder’s American Museum, obtained by Barnum in 1841 and
changed to the more simple title of the American Museum, offered for viewing “…a
tattooed man; H.G. Sherman, a ballad singer; dioramas of European landscapes and
Biblical scenes; an albino lady; a model of Niagara Falls with running water…” and a
number of other curiosities and entertainments. 17 These entertainment venues quickly
drew the public’s attention away from the more legitimate natural history museums.
Since both types of museums were privately operated for profit, those with educational
exhibits failed to attract enough audiences in order to remain open.18 Charles Wilson
Peale’s museum of natural and historical exhibits was itself eventually bought by Barnum
and subsequently began to display similar oddities as the American Museum.19 In this
way, the antebellum American “museum” came to represent a form of popular
entertainment, rather than popular education.20

the population, inspiring morality, and encouraging a selfless devotion to the state, the nation turned
increasingly toward commerce and individualism.” Ibid., 74.
15
Sally Gregory Kohlstedt, “Entrepreneurs and Intellectuals: Natural History in Early American
Museums,” in Mermaids, Mummies, and Mastodons: The Emergence of the American Museum, ed.
William T. Alderson (Washington, D.C.: American Association of Museums, 1992), 33.
16
Harris, Humbug: The Art of P.T. Barnum, 35.
17
Ibid., 41.
18
Ibid., 35.
19
Barnum secretly bought Peale’s museum in 1843 from its manager, in order to generate publicity
between competing exhibits. Neil Harris, Humbug; the Art of P.T. Barnum, [1st ]. ed. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1973). 42
20
Alan Wallach, Exhibiting Contradiction: Essays on the Art Museum in the United States (Amherst, Mass:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1998), 24.
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American Art Museums Acquire
Despite the number of private individuals and concerns financing museums, whether for
popular entertainment or education, art museums as we know them today did not begin to
emerge in the United States until after the conclusion of the Civil War. According to Alan
Wallach, the sudden interest in establishing art museums after the Civil War arose as a
result of an emerging national upper class interested in formulating a high art aesthetic. 21
With the United States government continuing to demonstrate a lack of interest in
establishing any kind of national museum, individuals took it upon themselves to
establish art museums that would educate and culturally uplift audiences. The American
art museums founded between 1870 and 1900 were modeled after either London’s South
Kensington complex (which eventually became the Victoria & Albert Museum) or the
Louvre in Paris.22
The South Kensington, a complex of schools and museums merging science and
art in an attempt to raise the tastes of British producers and consumers, provided a
particularly pertinent example to American museum founders. Growing out of the
enthusiasm generated from the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition in London, the South
Kensington complex was intended to raise the taste of both British consumers and
producers through its displays of both fine and industrial arts. The South Kensington
model appealed to some of the more democratically-minded museum builders in the
United States.23 The American Centennial Exhibition, held in Philadelphia, had revealed
the woeful state of national products and fine arts as compared to other international
exhibitors. Similar to their British counterparts, the original initiators of American
industrial art museums hoped to repeat Britain’s industrial success through the elevation
of their fellow countrymen’s aesthetic taste.24 To do this, massive quantities of tools,
weapons, textiles and other forms of industrial arts were gathered from around the world,
and then displayed so as to create exhibits which conveyed information through their
arrangement.25 Nineteenth-century exhibit designers in industrial art museums took as
their cue the Linnaean classification system used at this time by natural history and
21

Wallach, Exhibiting Contradiction: Essays on the Art Museum in the United States, 21.
Conn, Museums and American Intellectual Life, 1876-1926, 194-95.
23
Ibid, 195-96.
24
Ibid., 199.
25
Ibid. Conn uses the term “object-based epistemology” to describe this phenomenon. See pg. 23-24.
22
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science museums. Objects were systematically arranged and classified so that the
American industrial producer could compare groups of similar tools from different
cultures. For example, a hammer from sixteenth century Denmark stood in as a whole for
the category of hammers, just as a butterfly in a natural history museum could stand in as
a whole for its genus. Like displays in contemporary natural history museums, the more
examples to show the variety and congruity of a species in a genus, the better
understanding one could obtain. This gave an observer the opportunity to compare and
contrast more fully a group of objects’ differences and similarities, and then apply his
new knowledge to his own work.26 In this manner, craftsmen and other manufacturers
could raise their aesthetic taste to a higher level, eventually resulting in an increase in the
quality of their craftsmanship. With superior quality products, people hoped to be able to
compete with and hopefully surpass the European industrial economy.
For example, in Cincinnati, an art museum devoted to the industrials arts was
founded in 1881, in conjunction with a school offering classes for women on the arts of
“…china painting, watercolor painting, and artistic embroidery.”27 According to its
founders, the concentration on applied arts, rather than fine arts, seemed more appropriate
to Cincinnati, a center of business and industry.28 Similarly, the Chicago Academy of
Fine Arts (now known as the Art Institute of Chicago), founded in 1878, was begun by
businessmen assured that art education would ultimately lead to the commercial success
of their city. Throughout the 1880s, evening and Saturday classes were offered to train
working-class artisans in woodcarving, ornamental design, mosaic, frescoing, and stained
glass.29
In addition to the industrial art museums, fine art museums were also founded at
the end of the nineteenth century in America. Established by wealthy magnates interested
in not only elevating the taste and morals of their fellow countrymen, but also in raising
their own status and that of their cities, these fine art museums chose the Louvre as their

26

Ibid., 206.
Kenneth R. Trapp, “Art Palace of the West: Its Beginnings,” in Celebrate Cincinnati Art: In Honor of the
One Hundredth Anniversary of the Cincinnati Art Museum, 1881-1981 ([Cincinnati, Ohio]: The Museum,
1982), 23.
28
Ibid., 18.
29
Barbara Jaffee, “Before the New Bauhaus: From Industrial Drawing to Art and Design Education in
Chicago,” Design Issues 21, no. 1 (2005).
27
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model.30 The Louvre, with its emphasis on displaying the great artistic achievements of
mankind, ultimately proved a more appealing choice than the South Kensington, with its
more humble focus on everyday craft. Many of these museums began with (usually)
European works donated or purchased specifically for them by wealthy trustees.
Additionally, there was also a desire to display high-caliber examples of antique and
Renaissance art. For many, these two epochs in the history of art represented “…the
genius of man at its highest period of development in the world of art.”31
One of the most well-known fine art museums in America, the Metropolitan
Museum of Art in New York, was founded in 1872 with 174 European old master
paintings. These paintings, consisting mostly of Northern Baroque old masters, reflected
not only the taste of the moment on the part of the purchasers, but also a specific moment
of opportunity.32 William Tilden Blodgett (1823-1875) bought all of the works from 1870
to 1872 in Europe for the specific purpose of being the founding collection of the
museum. The first chairman of the executive committee and also the first vice president
of the Metropolitan Museum, Blodgett had taken advantage of the conditions of the
Franco-Prussian War while acquiring the initial Metropolitan Museum collection. As a
result of the disastrous French war, beleaguered aristocrats were jettisoning artworks in
attempts to avoid financial ruin, and Blodgett was in the position to buy works the
trustees might not have been able to afford at any other time. 33
In addition to old master paintings, the Metropolitan Museum, along with other
fine art museums such as the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, wanted to display sculptures
representing the peak of mankind’s creativity, which according to nineteenth century
opinion, took place during the Classical and Renaissance periods. However, sculptures of
this age and caliber proved difficult to obtain. The solution to this obstacle came in the
form of plaster reproductions. From about 1874 to 1914, American fine art museums
bought, borrowed, and commissioned plaster casts and electrotype reproductions of

30

Conn, Museums and American Intellectual Life, 1876-1926, 195.
Samuel L. B. Parrish, Historical, Bibliographical, and Descriptive Catalogue of the Objects Exhibited at
the Southampton Art Museum (New York: B.H. Tyrrel, 1898), ix-x. Cited in Wallach, Exhibiting
Contradiction: Essays on the Art Museum in the United States, 38.
32
Katherine Baetjer, “Buying Pictures for New York: The Founding Purchase of 1871,” Metropolitan
Museum Journal 38 (2004), 161, 172.
33
Ibid., 162-63.
31
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famous, but unmovable, artworks residing in Europe.34 They were intended to serve the
didactic purpose of indoctrinating an American public into the eternal values represented
by classical art. As Alan Wallach terms it, this “cast culture” of the United States was
predicated on the European humanist approach to education, with its emphasis on the
study of Greek and Latin, as well as classical literature and art. At first resolutely
dedicating themselves to public education based on this European model, American
museums used casts and reproductions of classical and Renaissance art in order to
represent to a broad audience the entire canon of antique sculpture. With any luck,
exposure to the highest expressions of man’s creativity would convey to the American
public the values and beliefs associated with the classical European tradition.35
An example of this enthusiasm for plaster casts can be seen again in the example
of the Metropolitan Museum. Between 1890 and 1894, the Metropolitan Museum raised
almost $80,000 for the purchase of casts, which were to be “…historically arranged, so as
to illustrate the progress and development of plastic art in all epochs, and mainly in those
that have influenced our civilization.”36 The emphasis on the Classical and Renaissance
eras can be seen in the museum’s 1908 catalog of plaster casts, which is devoted mainly
to “Greek and Roman Art” and “Renaissance Art.”37 Likewise, the Boston Museum of
Fine Arts opened in 1876 with a total of seventy-five casts. Twenty-five of these casts
were on loan from the Boston Athenaeum, while the other fifty were purchased with
proceeds from the sale of original oil paintings bequeathed to the museum by Charles
Sumner.38 It is clear, especially in light of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts example, that
late nineteenth century American art museums were not concerned with Benjamin’s aura
of authenticity just yet. Rather, the didactic and civilizing aspects represented by the
canon of plaster casts served to raise the minds and tastes of the American public, so they
could better compete with their European brethren.
34

Wallach, Exhibiting Contradiction: Essays on the Art Museum in the United States, 38. Electrotype
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American Art Museums Begin Deaccessioning
Although many fine art and industrial arts museums were established at the same time in
the late nineteenth century, it was the fine art museums that ultimately proved most
popular in the twentieth. Industrial arts museums suffered in popularity in part because
the United States gradually surpassed Europe on both an economic and industrial level.
The perceived need for the display of handicrafts waned as a result. The very way in
which industrial arts museums exhibited their collections was also out of sync with the
growing concern for the originality of an artwork. The cult of artistic originality, begun
by the Romantics in the mid-nineteenth century and continued by modern artists into the
twentieth century, led to a revaluation of how and what was displayed in American art
museums. Wealthy patrons who funded art museums no longer saw the value of displays
of utilitarian objects that might or might not be viewed by their employees. Instead, they
often preferred to donate their money for the purchase of original artworks in order to
conspicuously display their largesse and their refined taste.39
In response to the changing taste of trustees and audiences, some museums that
originally began with displays of handicrafts shifted their emphasis to the fine arts. An
example of this is the Pennsylvania Museum in Philadelphia. Established in 1876,
immediately following the end of the Centennial Exposition, the Pennsylvania Museum
began with democratic and educational objectives in mind. The museum taxonomically
displayed utilitarian objects in addition to operating a school of industrial design. Both
the museum and the school were established in order to educate Philadelphia’s artisans in
good design.40 However, the Pennsylvania Museum began to increasingly turn away from
the industrial arts, instead choosing to focus upon collecting and displaying the fine arts.
A number of factors influenced this decision. One chief cause for this institutional redirection included a lack of interest generated by the taxonomic displays. The desire to
scientifically arrange collections by material, use, or even geographical origin created a
dizzying display that tended to confuse visitors, rather than enlighten.41 The final blow to
the Pennsylvania Museum’s industrial arts objectives came in 1882, when the museum
39
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trustees accepted the Wilstach Collection, a group of over three hundred largely
European oil paintings.42 The addition of the paintings signaled a change in direction for
the museum. Attendance jumped, as people flocked to view the fine art among the
furniture. The recognition that industrial workers wanted to see fine art, in addition to
industrial art, ultimately led to the decision to begin the “retirement of many of the least
meritorious objects in the various departments”.43 One of the reasons given for this
choice was that the removal of less important objects resulted in increasing the value of
the art kept on display.44
The increasing emphasis on the aesthetic pleasure that could only be provided by
authentic, unique artworks also led to the gradual removal of plaster casts from fine art
museums. By about 1906, the popularity of plaster casts in fine art museums such as the
Metropolitan Museum and the Boston Museum of Fine Art began to wane.45 Like the
industrial arts museums that were gradually turning themselves into fine art museums,
fine art museums were increasingly focusing on what they considered authentic and
unique works of art, which were also most popular with their patrons.46 Although some
art museums retained their plaster casts collections to be used in drawing classes, most
were relegated to storerooms, or disposed of altogether.47
The reigning philosophy of the art museum as temple continued throughout the
majority of the twentieth century.48 As places in which genuine works of art were to
assuage the soul and give aesthetic pleasure, objects viewed either as inferior in quality or
unnecessary duplicates were very often deaccessioned from museum collections. In 1929,
the president of the Metropolitan Museum, Robert W. deForest, decided to deaccession
and sell 159 paintings and 675 objects from the museum’s permanent collections. At this
point in time, the Metropolitan Museum was literally running out of storage room for the
vast amount of material it owned or was given. The curators had attempted to solve the
42
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problem by lending some objects to other museums. Despite this, it was felt that excess
works and those of less exemplary value needed to be disposed of.49 This is in keeping
with the belief of museum curators and trustees that only the best should remain in a
permanent collection. Throughout the twentieth century, the Metropolitan Museum
continued the refinement of its collections through deaccessions and disposals. Out of the
original 174 paintings the museum began with, 110 have been sold.50 The majority of
these paintings proved to have been wrongly attributed to more famous artists, or in such
poor condition that they could not be displayed.51 With the reputation of the Metropolitan
Museum resting upon quality, the desire to attract both crowds and donors with highcaliber artworks may have led to the deaccessioning and disposal of what was seen as
less worthy objects.
From their inception, museums in America, particularly art museums, did not rely
upon government funding as their main source of revenue. From Charles Willson Peale to
Robert DeForest and beyond, museum curators and directors continuously struggled to
attract both paying audiences and private trustees willing to donate time, money, and art.
Moreover, depending upon whom and with what an art museum was begun, later
museum administrators and boards had to creatively deal with what they had inherited.
With this situation, American art museums were surely more agreeable to change
themselves and their collections when it was felt to be necessary. While this statement is
not to be construed as criticism, this historical willingness for museums to alter
themselves eventually created conflicts in the late twentieth century between art
museums that deaccessioned and a public that gradually saw itself deeply invested in
these same art museums.

49

Thomas Hoving, Making the Mummies Dance: Inside the Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1993), 290.
50
Baetjer, “Buying Pictures for New York: The Founding Purchase of 1871, 171.
51
Ibid., 185-87. The majority of these paintings were sold in 1956, 1981-82, and 1994.

13

III. Government Funding and Thomas Hoving: Art Museums in the Face of Public
Accountability
The readiness of American art museums to alter themselves and their collections has not
always met with approval from the public. After World War II, a number of art
institutions in New York, Philadelphia, Minneapolis and other cities deaccessioned and
sold a large number of artworks in order to improve the quality of their permanent
collections. The public vocally disagreed with the museums’ decisions, and as a result, art
museums avoided deaccessioning for several decades. 52 Yet the American public’s
interest in the actions of art museums was only to increase during the 1960s and 1970s.
This was in part a consequence of augmented government support in the form of the
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities, in addition to the Museum Services
Act. The general populace became increasingly aware that not only did art museums hold
artworks in the public trust, but that museums were also being directly funded with tax
dollars.53 Consequently, when Thomas Hoving deaccessioned works from the
Metropolitan Museum of Art’s permanent collection in 1971, critics and government
officials accused Hoving and the museum of being short-sighted and all too willing to
jettison what they saw as artistic treasures.
Government Funding for the Arts in Mid-Twentieth Century America
During the 1960s and 1970s, America experienced an exponential increase of non-profit
arts organizations, including art museums. One of the many possible stimuli for this
unprecedented growth came from the congressional establishment in 1965 of the National
Foundation on the Arts and Humanities. Composed of the National Endowment for the
Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Federal Council on the Arts

52

Michael Conforti, “Deaccessioning American Museums: II—Some Thoughts for England,” in A
Deaccession Reader, ed. Stephen E. Weil (Washington, D.C.: American Association of Museums, 2002),
74.
53
Artistic and cultural organizations in the United States have been indirectly funded since the earliest days
of the Republic, when they were exempt from property taxes. Beginning in the twentieth century, museums
have also been exempt from federal, state, and local, income, death and gift taxes. See Dick Netzer, The
Subsidized Muse: Public Support for the Arts in the United States (Cambridge: New York, 1978), 43-44.

14

and Humanities, these three agencies were founded by Congress in order to strengthen
the artistic and cultural life in the United States.54 The 1965 act states:
…it is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to help create and sustain
not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry, but also the
material conditions facilitating the release of this creative talent.55

Almost 150 years after Charles Willson Peale petitioned for support from the federal
government, Congress had at last recognized the democratic importance of subsidizing
the arts. By 1980, all fifty states followed congressional example by establishing state art
agencies.56 Both the federal and state art agencies had policies intended to:
…increase opportunities for an appreciation and enjoyment of the arts through wider
distribution; to sustain and encourage individual performers and creative artists; to
increase the participation of the people in local artistic programs; and to provide the
people with new opportunities in all aspects of the arts.57

To sustain and increase the appreciation of the arts in America, from 1971 to 1974 the
National Endowment for the Arts gave grants to museums totaling approximately $18.7
million, amounting to twelve percent of total allocated funds from that agency.58
Museums were specifically given an even larger boost in 1977, when Congress
enacted the Museum Services Act. This purpose of the act is:
(1) to encourage and support museums in carrying out their public service role of
connecting the whole of society to the cultural, artistic, historical, natural, and
scientific understandings that constitute our heritage;
(2) to encourage and support museums in carrying out their educational role, as core
providers of learning and in conjunction with schools, families, and communities;
(3) to encourage leadership, innovation, and applications of the most current
technologies and practices to enhance museum services;
(4) to assist, encourage, and support museums in carrying out their stewardship
responsibilities to achieve the highest standards in conservation and care of the
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cultural, historic, natural, and scientific heritage of the United States to benefit future
generations;
(5) to assist, encourage, and support museums in achieving the highest standards of
management and service to the public, and to ease the financial burden borne by
museums as a result of their increasing use by and public; and
(6) to support resource sharing and partnerships among museums, libraries, schools, and
other community organizations.59

Although the act does not provide funding for construction expenses, having federal
support for programs may have encouraged the development of new museums.
Almost one-third of all art museums in operation in the United States today were founded
within the last twenty years.60 While trustees and donors have almost always contributed
financially to the art museums they choose to support, the commencement of funding by
the federal government in 1965 and then again in 1977 further increased museums’
ability to expand their programs, projects, and activities.61
Thomas Hoving’s “Drive for the Best”
The increasing public interest in the arts and art museums, as well as a greater level of
accountability now expected of art museums possibly led to one of the first significant
battles over deaccessioning in the late twentieth century. In 1967, Thomas Hoving
became the director of the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art. A medieval art
historian by training, Hoving originally began in the curatorial department of The
Cloisters of the Metropolitan Museum, gradually working his way up to become a full
curator of the Medieval Department. In spite of this promising start, Hoving left the
museum in 1965 for a job as the New York City parks commissioner, under the mayor
John V. Lindsay.62 It was perhaps as parks commissioner that Hoving honed his skills for
attracting the public eye. In Making the Mummies Dance, his “tell-all” memoir of his
time as the Metropolitan Museum’s director, Hoving admits that when he was parks
commissioner, his middle initials, P.F., were speculated to stand for “Publicity
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Forever.”63 When hired as director of the Metropolitan Museum in 1967, Hoving brought
with him his acumen for drawing both public love and ire. Among his many controversial
actions as director, none was more so than the aggressive deaccessionings he enacted in
1971. These deaccessions, undertaken during a time of increased government
involvement and funding, brought to the fore questions of the legal and ethical
obligations of art museums that still resound today.64
At a 1968 Metropolitan Museum acquisitions meetings, Hoving had a sudden
revelation as a result of a curator’s request for funds to buy Antonio Canova’s Perseus
Holding the Head of the Gorgan, an eight-foot tall sculpture:
To hell with the dribs and drabs—the little Egyptian pieces, the fragments, the also-rans.
From then on I’d acquire only the big, rare, fantastic pieces, the expensive ones, the ones
that would cause a splash. With the incalculable number of treasures already in the
museum why bother with the footnotes? It would serve the Met more to collect nothing
for years to save the money to obtain a single piece if it were one of the world’s finest
masterworks. The day of relatively inexpensive acquisitions would soon be over. We had
to drive for the best now. 65

Rather than acquiring small, relatively inexpensive works of art, Hoving now encouraged
his curators to dream big and look to purchase works of art sure to attract attention. In
order to fund his “drive for the best,” in 1971 Hoving and his curators began to
systematically weed out and sell “unneeded works of art, and use the money to acquire
better, far more needed works of art.”66 For Hoving, these “needed” works of art
consisted of the very best, rather then the “dribs and drabs.”
Much of what was deaccessioned came from the very recent 1967 bequest of
Adelaide Milton de Groot. The Metropolitan’s lawyers determined that despite the
stipulation in de Groot’s will to give unwanted paintings to local museums, the phrase
“without limiting in any way the absolute nature of this bequest,” meant the Metropolitan
staff could do anything they wanted with the somewhat ‘mediocre’ collection of
63
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paintings.67 In addition to the de Groot collection, a large number of paintings were also
slated for sale, including Manet’s Boy with a Sword (fig. II.1; 1860-1), George Moore
(Au Café) (fig. II.2; 1873-9), and Woman with a Parrot (fig. II.3; 1886), Cézanne’s View
of the Domaine Saint-Joseph (La Colline des Pauvres) (fig. II.4; c. 1880s), Renoir’s In
the Meadow (fig. II.5; 1888-92), Gauguin’s A Farm in Brittany (fig. II.6; 1894), and
Picasso’s Woman in White (fig. II.7; 1923).68 The majority of these paintings had been
given to the museum through bequests. A few works, such as Cezanne’s La Colline des
Pauvres and Picasso’s Woman in White, had been bought by the Metropolitan in the first
decades of the twentieth century.69 The Metropolitan also chose to sell van Gogh’s The
Olive Pickers and Rousseau’s Tropics. 70 According to Hoving, Picasso’s Woman in
White could be sold because the museum had a better Picasso, the Portrait of Gertrude
Stein, while others, such as the Gauguin and Manet’s Woman with a Parrot were either of
“so-so quality” or had been poorly restored.71
Despite the process of checks and balances the Metropolitan went through before
deciding to deaccession and sell these paintings, the decision to dispose of such a large
number of works by famous artists drew sharp criticism and much negative publicity. 72
One of the most vehement critics of the sales was John Canaday, art critic for the New
York Times. Accusing the Metropolitan of being short-sighted and unethical in an article
titled, “Very Quiet and Very Dangerous,” Canaday states that selling works, even if they
are minor, is too risky a business in a market where art once thought worthless can later
be seen as high quality.73 Hoving replied to Canaday’s accusations in a scathing editorial,
averring that:
…the Metropolitan is not a Library of Congress of works of art, nor an archive similar to
an etymological collection of a natural history museum. It is based upon the belief that
67
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the business of a great art museum is quality, not numbers. Its business is to show the
very finest works of art and in such a way that every visitor will be able to appreciate
and understand them.74

In an attempt to quell the editorial battle between the art critic and his director, Douglas
Dillon, president of the Metropolitan, wrote his own editorial, clarifying the
Metropolitan’s stance on disposal of artworks. He states that the sale of artworks is
nothing new, and since its existence the Metropolitan had sold over 50,000 objects from
its collections. He explained that the decision to sell these works is only to “refine and
improve our collections for the greater benefit of the public. The proceeds of sales are
used exclusively for the purchase of finer and more significant works of art.”75 Dillon
continued by describing the stringent process used to determine whether or not to dispose
of an artwork.76 To further assuage public dissent, the board and administration of the
Metropolitan issued a public booklet in 1973 of its newly modified procedures for
deaccessioning and disposing artworks.77 Largely due to the public flap over the
deaccessions, several paintings were ‘re-accessioned’ and withdrawn from auction,
although The Olive Pickers and the Tropics paintings were ultimately sold to a private
buyer.78
Despite the Metropolitan’s attempts to quell public discontent, its decision to
dispose of a large number of paintings at auction was a catalyst for government inquiry
into non-profit museum practices. Issues of ethics and the public trust were for the first
time brought out by the Metropolitan Museum’s deaccessions.79 The uproar caused by
the Metropolitan’s sales resulted in a public hearing initiated by the attorney general of
the State of New York to discuss museums and their disposal policies.80 When the public
hearing convened on October 19, 1973, New York State attorney general Louis J.
Lefkowitz reminded the museum professionals present their duty “to guard and preserve
74
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the artistic and historic treasures” in their care.81 This trusteeship, Lefkowitz reminded
them, engendered responsibility on their part to adhere to restrictions placed on donated
works of art, in order to maintain non-profit status. According to the attorney general, the
actions of the Metropolitan exposed the need for museums to be more self-regulatory in
their day-to-day operations in the area of purchase and disposition, so as to avoid being
subjected to state legislation.82
The majority of museum professionals in attendance at the hearing responded
negatively to Lefkowitz’s suggestion. Steven E. Weil, then deputy director of the
Whitney Museum of American Art in New York, eloquently expressed the museum
industry’s opposition to creating general self-regulating policies regarding the disposal of
art. Responding to the question if other art museums should adopt the disposal policies
agreed to by the Metropolitan, Weil stated that the attorney general’s proposals “so
ignore the realities of how museum collections have been assembled, how they can best
be refined and upgraded, and how the art market actually works, that rather than
furthering the public interest, we think it would damage it.”83 Weil, who would later go
on to advocate deaccessioning as a necessary and normal museum activity, recognized
that art museums are individual, and that applying broad deaccessioning policies could
potentially create difficulties for unique institutions.
Despite museum professionals’ protestations against broad deaccessioning
standards, it is very clear that critics and the government felt the Metropolitan Museum’s
actions had betrayed the public trust. Although the majority of art museums in America
are privately funded, they normally are chartered to serve a charitable (or educational)
purpose. As such, the objects within museums’ collections are considered to be held in
trust for the public.84 In return for serving the public, art museums are given benefits,
such as tax exemption, and increasingly during the 1960s and 1970s, direct funding by
both state and federal government agencies. The Metropolitan Museum itself had
received in 1974 $428,000 in museum grants to mount a centenary exhibition of
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Impressionism.85 To retain these benefits, art museums are expected to act in a way that
guarantees the public’s continuance of trust in them.86 As both John Canaday and Louis J.
Lefkowitz emphasized, selling artworks can be seen as not only short-sighted in terms of
art history, but also a failure on the part of the trustees to safeguard the art for posterity.
Yet if the Metropolitan Museum had tried to sell artworks by unimportant or unknown
artists, it is possible public trust issues would not have surfaced. By selling important
artworks by important artists, the Metropolitan Museum succeeded in raising awareness
of deaccessioning to a new level.
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Figure II.1 Édouard Manet,
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Oil on canvas,
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Figure II.2 Édouard Manet,
George Moore (au Café), 1873-79,
Oil on canvas,
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.
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Figure II.4 Paul Cézanne, View of the
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Figure II.5 Pierre-Auguste Renoir,
In the Meadow, 1888-92,
Oil on canvas,
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Figure II.6 Paul Gauguin,
A Farm in Brittany, 1894,
Oil on canvas,
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Figure II.6 Pablo Picasso, Woman in White,
1923, Oil on canvas,
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.
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IV. The Reagan Administration: Art Museums Struggle for Survival
The funding provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, even with the
increased expectation of public accountability (as revealed by the outrage over the
Metropolitan Museum’s deaccessions), allowed art museums to flourish throughout the
1970s. However, governmental assistance was dramatically reduced with the arrival of
the Reagan administration in 1981. It was perhaps in response to the significant decrease
in direct funding by the federal government that art museums once again had to
increasingly rely on different methods for sustainability, some of which involved the
deaccessioning of objects. Progressively, art museums began using marketing strategies
in order to better compete for engaged volunteers, audiences, board members, as well as
grants, donations, and bequests.87 One method among many used to achieve sustainability
included the “market repositioning” of a museum.88 “Market repositioning” occurs when
a museum decides to move away from its traditional audience and thus build new
constituencies.89 This method normally leads to drastic changes in what a museum
collects. Market repositions often results in the deaccessioning of objects from a
permanent collection, and the acquisition of new artworks. In a similar marketing
practice, termed “branding,” art museums with already strong collections and audiences
can purchase artworks which further strengthen their distinctive identity.90 Both
marketing tactics are meant to increase an art museum’s ability to compete for visitors
with a variety of leisure options, and for donors and sponsor dollars.91 Yet as art
museums in America undertook these strategies in regards to their collections during the
1980s, they found themselves unable to buy without selling. As a consequence, the
specter of public trust, first raised in 1971 by the Metropolitan Museum, reappeared.
Before discussing the marketing tactics art museums engaged in in order to
compete more successfully, it is enlightening to briefly examine what exactly is the
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market that museums are competing for. Although museums began adopting businessstyle language such as “market repositioning” and “branding,” there is a distinct
difference between what a for-profit competes for and what a non-profit competes for. In
a for-profit business, competition is over the personal acquisition of profits. In contrast,
non-profit organizations, like art museums, compete for revenues, board members,
customers, contracts and grants, donations, gifts and bequests, prestige, political power,
and volunteers.92 By beginning to utilize marketing tactics in the 1980s and 1990s,
museums acknowledged their role as service providers competing within a marketplace
for a market share.
The Reagan Administration’s Policy Toward the Arts
As a conservative president, Reagan’s beliefs regarding the funding of the arts mirrored
that of his early predecessors, Washington and Jefferson. Like them, he believed that the
arts should be financially supported by the private sector and not by the government.93 To
implement this policy, the president established the Office of Management and the
Budget, which recommended severe reductions in the federal government’s support for
the arts and humanities. Many worried that even the NEA might be entirely eliminated.94
While the dismantlement of the NEA never occurred, its budget was cut by ten percent in
1982, and government contributions stayed relatively flat throughout the length of the
decade. In addition, a Presidential Task Force on the Arts and Humanities was formed in
1981 to review the purposes, activities, and records of the Arts and Humanities
Endowments. The Task Force was also to find methods for increasing private, nongovernmental support for the arts and humanities.95 By suddenly and dramatically
reducing funding, the federal government put art museums and other arts organization in
a difficult position. Having increasingly relied upon the extra funding provided by
Washington, art museums now had to locate ways to become more self-sufficient
competitive in order to attract audiences and funding.
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The problematical situation created by the Reagan administration is illustrated in
a 1981 advertisement taken out by the Business Committee for the Arts, in cooperation
with the RCA Corporation (fig. III.1). Published in the January issue of ARTnews, the
advertisement, although not specifically mentioning the Reagan administration, states
that the “arts face an enormous cost problem” due to the “’labor intensive’” nature of the
arts which is particularly prone to the effects of severe inflation.96 Due to these high
costs, the Business Committee for the Arts urges support of the arts not only through
donations, attendance, and volunteerism, but to also petition local, state, and national
legislatures for assistance. Although the intended audience consists of one that already
participates in the arts, the advertisement points out that the expense of participating in
the arts is immeasurably smaller in proportion to actual operating and production costs.
This advertisement perhaps reveals the financial pinch arts organizations were beginning
to feel in the early 1980s, and is a blatant appeal to the readers of ARTnews to support
them in their time of need.
Market Repositioning Through Mission Statements
The advertisement taken out by the Business Committee for the Arts was only a small cry
for help targeted toward a very specific audience. Individual art museums had to take
their own steps in order to attract visitors and donors. One method art museums could
apply was by drastically revising their mission statements. All art museums in America
have mission statements which ultimately guide their actions toward their collections.
According to the American Association of Museums (AAM):

•

•

A mission statement describes the purpose of a museum—its reason for existence. It
defines the museum’s unique identity and purpose, and provides a distinct focus for the
institution.
A mission statement articulates the museum’s understanding of its role and
responsibility to the public and its collections, and reflects the environment in which it
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Founded in 1906, AAM is an organization that represents all professionals and volunteers
working within the museum community. AAM also helps to develop the professional
standards and practices of museums, which are generally accepted by most museums.98
According to AAM’s definition of a mission statement, it serves the purpose of guiding
every action taken by a museum, as well as stating the institution’s role and responsibility
to its collections and surrounding community.99 A comprehensive art museum mission
statement delineates the hoped-for quality of a collection, its intended audience, the
geographic scope which a museum hopes to influence, the specific area of art a museum
wants to collect, and the extent that education is to play a role.100 All of these factors are
influenced by the size and resources available to a particular museum. For example, the
Metropolitan Museum, a large art museum with multiple resources, can have an
encyclopedic scope and be capable of serving a large public. Its mission statement
reflects this capability:
The mission of the Metropolitan Museum of Art is to collect, preserve, study, exhibit, and
stimulate appreciation for and advance knowledge of works of art that collectively
represent the broadest spectrum of human achievement at the highest level of quality, all
in the service of the public and in accordance with the highest professional standards.101

The mission statement of the Metropolitan Museum indicates its purpose, “to collect,
preserve, study, exhibit, and stimulate appreciation for and advance knowledge of works
of art.” It also states its focus, which is all encompassing, and it is clear that the museum
is aware of its global audience, since the general word “public” is used rather than
indicating a specific audience, such as New York City. Essentially, the Metropolitan
Museum understands its role as a museum displaying a wide variety of artworks for the
benefit of a wide variety of people.
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Often, mission statements can slowly morph over time, depending upon the
governing board, the directors, curators, and available resources. They can also be
quickly adjusted so as not to conflict with other regional museums, and focus on a
specific area of collecting in order to exploit an untapped market niche. This type of
revision is usually called “market repositioning.”102 An example of market repositioning
occurred in 1990 when the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis chose to redefine itself
from its original beginnings as a museum displaying pre-twentieth century art from
around the globe, and instead become a center for contemporary art. The decision to
focus on contemporary art allowed the Walker to strategically reposition itself in contrast
to the Minneapolis Institute of Arts’ collection which surveys the history of world art.
A very brief perusal of the two Minneapolis art institutions current homepages on
the Internet clarifies the extent to which the Walker eventually took its 1990 “marketing
repositioning.” While both the Walker Art Center and the Minneapolis Institute of Arts
websites are similar, the impression left upon the viewer is ultimately very different. Both
the Walker and the Minneapolis Institute of Arts homepages have transitioning images in
the upper areas to communicate current exhibitions, with the lower areas of the pages
divided into different themed sections which the navigator can click on to access the
collections, current events, and other areas of interests. In spite of these visual
similarities, the Minneapolis Institute of Arts clearly presents itself as a traditional arts
institution, with a mission of bringing “…arts and people together to discover, enjoy, and
understand the world’s diverse artistic heritage.”103 The message is one of aesthetic and
purely mental pleasure. Overall, the homepage is static, with images of mostly premodern European and American art being viewed by passive spectators.
In contrast, the Walker Art Center declares as its mission to be “…a catalyst for
the creative expression of artists and the active engagement of audiences, examines the
questions that shape and inspire us as individuals, cultures, and communities.”104
Although one can argue that images of museum-goers can be seen passively enjoying the
art, the homepage attempts to engage the Internet viewer by locating the icons “connect,”
“join,” and “blogs” directly below the quickly moving images at the top of the page. The
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first two words “connect” and “join” mentally encourage participation. The third word,
“blog,” describes a new technology offered by the Internet that allows anyone with a
connected computer and a microphone to post verbal ideas, thoughts, and interviews. All
three words, and their location, quickly communicate the Walker’s desire to actively
engage its audience. Additionally, the Walker’s homepage emphasizes other activities its
Minnesota audience can participate in, including dance performances, classes, theatre,
and lectures. The Walker plainly positions itself as a community center in which both the
audience and the museum staff engage in a conversation about contemporary arts.
Museum Branding Through Acquisitions
While the Walker chose to commit itself fully to contemporary arts, other American art
museums with established collections opted to further strengthen their already existing
identities. According to the author Margot A. Wallace, the marketing technique of
“branding” allows American art museums to create “a distinctive identity that engenders
loyalty. Branding consists of creating and maintaining a body of programs and attitudes
that convey a clear promise, encourage familiarity, and generate ongoing support.”105
Collections and acquisitions are one of the most visible methods in which an art museum
is able to broadcast its formal identity.106 In the early 1990s, both the Museum of Modern
Art (hereafter MoMA) and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New York City
purchased works that helped to further brand their collections as supreme examples of
modern and contemporary art.
In 1989, MoMA purchased Van Gogh’s Portrait of Joseph Roulin (1889).
According to Kirk Varnedoe, the Director of the Department of Painting and Sculpture at
that time, maintained the Van Gogh purchase was to fill a perceived hole in the
museum’s collection.107 A year later, the Guggenheim acquired the Panza di Biumo
Collection of Minimalist and Conceptual art. This acquisition greatly expanded the
museum’s permanent collection, as well as adding depth to it by including examples of
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important American postwar artists.108 Additionally, not only did these artworks
complement the existing collections of the two museums, the purchases would also
hopefully attract new and returning audiences. While not nearly as dramatic as the
example of the Walker completely changing its mission, these acquisitions by MoMA
and the Guggenheim certainly publicly strengthened their brand familiarity as museums
displaying the best of modern and contemporary art.
The 1986 Tax Reform Act & A Booming Art Market: Museums Sell to Buy
Yet the transformation of the Walker collection and the additions to the collections of
MoMA and the Guggenheim were not carried out without sacrifices. In addition to the
funding restrictions imposed upon the NEA, which partially created the need for market
repositioning and branding in the first place, the federal government enacted a 1986 tax
reform act eradicating the deductibility of the market value of donated art objects. This
act “…required that the portion of any such contribution [stocks, bonds, artworks]
representing the appreciation over the donated property’s original cost basis be included
as a so-called tax preference item in the computation of an alternative minimum tax.”109
Essentially, what this means is that rather than being able to deduct the value an artwork
had appreciated over time and what it would be worth if put on the current market,
donors could only deduct what they had originally paid for the work. The restrictions
were partially enacted as a response to alleged abuse by donors who overvalued the
deduction of their gifts.110 With no monetary incentive to give to art museums, private
donations became less attractive and gradually tapered off to a mere trickle. American art
museums, as non-profit institutions almost exclusively relying on private donations to
their collections, suddenly faced a serious hurdle. How were they to acquire artworks that
would help them to achieve their goals?
In response to decreasing donations, many American art museums turned
increasingly to the art market to obtain works that would further specialize and strengthen
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their collections. Yet during the 1980s the acquisition budgets of most art museums failed
to meet the exorbitant prices being asked for artworks sold at auction. The rapid upsurge
of prices at this time can be attributed to a number of factors. Starting in the 1960s,
collecting art and antiques became a widespread mania due to a redistribution of wealth
in highly developed countries. Individuals with an excess of cash came to see art as an
investment that almost never decreased in value, which also had the added benefit of
increasing their personal prestige.111 By 1979, auction records for fine arts, antiques, and
decorative arts were continually being broken.112 Especially favored were artworks of the
Impressionist, Post-Impressionist, and Modernist eras. In 1980, Susumu Yamamoto of
Fiji Television Gallery of Tokyo successfully bid on Picasso’s Saltimbanque (Acrobat)
Seated with Arms Crossed. The winning bid was $3 million, the highest price paid for a
painting other than an old master.113 That same year, Van Gogh’s Le Jardin du Poète,
Arles sold for $5.2 million, speculated to be the highest price ever paid for a painting at
auction. The record price before this had been $5 million, the price paid in 1970 by the
Metropolitan Museum for Velasquez’s Portrait of Juan de Pareja.114 Records continued
to be broken throughout the 1980s. In spite of the 1987 stock market crash, Van Gogh’s
Irises sold at a Sotheby’s auction to Alan Bond for $53.9 million, the highest price ever
paid for a painting at auction.115 Work by Van Gogh proved to be a perennially hot ticket
item yet again in 1990, when The Portrait of Dr. Gachet was bought at a Christie’s
auction for $82.5 million by Hideto Kobayashi of the Gallery Kobayashi of Tokyo.116
These astronomical prices often prevented art museums from purchasing great artworks
for their collections.
Since few American museums could afford to purchase outright a painting priced
at over a million dollars, artworks were very often deaccessioned and sold in order to
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raise funds for the purchase of new artworks. Large auction houses such as Christie’s and
Sotheby’s saw a significant increase in sales from museum collections. Christie’s share
went from three million dollars in sales from museum collections during the 1984-85
season, to thirty million in the 1989-90 season. At the same time, the auction house went
from doing business with twenty-eight museums to eighty-eight. Sotheby’s also saw a
dramatic rise in revenue in sales from museum collections. Between 1985 and 1989,
almost thirty-nine million dollars in sales came from objects deaccessioned by only six
art museums.117
Yet when American art museums deaccessioned in order to raise purchasing
funds, questions of public accountability and trust arose. Although art museums were
only reacting to the economic and financial hardships experienced by all arts
organizations during the 1980s, deaccessioning with the intention of increasing
purchasing funds particularly upset the public. The Metropolitan Museum’s deaccessions
originally had raised awareness of the issue in 1971. When art museums began to
deaccession again on a large scale almost two decades later, the same questions of public
trust were repeated. The examples of the Walker Art Center, MoMA, and the
Guggenheim are helpful in exploring the multi-faceted arguments offered by those who
were against and those who were for deaccessioning.
With its new focus on contemporary art, the Walker in particular needed a
significant increase in acquisition funds in order to purchase an almost entirely new
collection. One way money was raised was through the deaccessioning and selling of
objects from its original collection of 19th and 20th century American and European
paintings, Chinese porcelains, Syrian glass, and Near Eastern jewelry. In 1989, the items
were auctioned to raise money for the purchase of works deemed more appropriate to the
Walker’s new mission.118 Frederic Church’s Home by the Lake (fig. III.7) was among
those sold. Church’s painting brought $8.25 million at auction, a record for the time, and
the sale price purportedly raised the Walker’s acquisition funds from $116,000 a year to
$600,000.119
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Many critics were against the sale, arguing that at an auction the Church painting
would very likely be bought by a private individual and be lost to the public patrimony
forever. However, an attempt had been made to keep the Church landscape available to
the public. The painting was offered for sale to the Minneapolis Institute of Art and other
Minnesota museums before the public auction. Unfortunately, the Minneapolis Institute,
with financial problems of its own, could not afford to purchase the painting. Despite the
efforts to keep the Church available to the public critics were not acquiesced. The chief
culture critic of The Washington Post, John Yardley, grumbled that “…thanks to selling
off giants of the 19th century, the museum has the money to buy up more pygmies of the
20th.” 120 Yardley’s comment reveals the general opinion held by many that the Walker
had betrayed the public trust by selling a work of an already established artist, Church, in
order to invest in lesser known contemporary artists who might or might not eventually
be critically received into the canon of art history. Yet the sale of the painting was within
the full rights of the Walker. With the market repositioning of its mission, it made little
sense to retain objects that no longer fit into the collecting policies of the Walker, and
would only succeed in further draining limited resources.
When MoMA and the Guggenheim also deaccessioned to raise purchasing funds
in 1989 and 1990, they too faced criticism for their actions, especially because artworks
were removed from their permanent collections in order to purchase specific pieces
which had recently come on the market. The exchange of “new for old” was seen by the
curators and boards of the two museums as a logical way of obtaining works of art that
further strengthened their existing collections and brand identities. This was very much in
contrast to critics who saw the sales not only as ethically shady, but also as yet another
example of art museums betraying the public trust by selling the public patrimony.
In 1989, van Gogh’s Portrait of Joseph Roulin (fig III.2; 1889) became available
for purchase through a private collector. As mentioned above, the curator Varnedoe
believed the van Gogh would be beneficial to the museum’s collection, since it only
possessed one other painting by the artist, Starry Night (1889), and no portraits.121 To
acquire the painting, a deal was struck between the MoMA and the anonymous Swiss
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seller of van Gogh’s portrait. The museum exchanged four paintings, Picasso’s Striped
Bodice (1956), Kandinsky’s Autumn Landscape, Murnau (1908), Monet’s Corona (Water
Lilies) (1920), and Renoir’s Reclining Nude (fig. III.3; 1902) and an undisclosed amount
of cash loaned by a bank for the portrait. To raise funds for the payment of the loan, three
more paintings were deaccessioned so they could be auctioned at Sotheby’s: de Chirico’s
Evangelical Still Life (1916), Picasso’s Studio in a Painted Frame (1956), and
Mondrian’s Blue Façade (Composition 9) (1913-14).122
When the sales and exchange were announced publicly much later, MoMA was
criticized sharply because of the secret nature of the transactions, indicating that in the
public’s mind, museums are the keepers of a public trust. Many felt the MoMA had
transgressed that trust by selling the paintings without prior public notice.123 The museum
was forced to disclose the details of the sales and justify what was seen as an elitist
decision to deaccession and sell the paintings. Critics argued the deaccessions sent a
mixed message to potential donors, who might decide against giving artworks to
museums which could possibly later sell their well-intended gifts.124 Additionally, it was
believed that the museum gave Van Gogh too much primacy as an artist.125 Questions
were raised concerning whether or not the museum was eschewing a more
comprehensive collection for an artist who might have limited popularity in the future,
compared to those sold.
To answer the allegations that MoMA was too eager to jettison works in a hot art
market, defenders of the sales and exchanges highlighted the difficulties caused by that
very same market, as well as the relative quality of the deaccessioned artworks compared
to the van Gogh portrait. William Rubin, former Director of the Department of Painting
and Sculpture at MoMA, strongly supported the sales. It was he who had first wanted to
buy the portrait of the postman when it had originally come up for sale. At that time, the
astronomical prices being asked for any van Gogh prevented the museum’s ability to
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purchase it. In 1989, however, when the portrait came on to the market a second time,
prices of certain paintings in the MoMA collection had sufficiently risen enough that the
money raised by their sales would cover the cost of the Van Gogh painting. Rubin
approved of the actions taken by Varnedoe, and defended him by pointing out that
(according to him) the museum owned better examples of de Chirico, Picasso, and
Mondrian.126 Both Varnedoe and Rubin also agreed that in addition to not having an
important place in the story the museum was trying to tell, the Renoir painting was not a
particularly good work by the artist.127 MoMA’s director, Richard Oldenburg echoed
these sentiments, stating “… that you give up something to get something. Our mission
isn’t just to keep and conserve objects but to do it for a purpose: to strive for the highest
level of quality to bring to the public.”128 Ultimately, for those involved with the
deaccessions, the belief was that the MoMA had not been left bereft. If anything, the
museum had instead gained an important example by one of the leading 19th century
predecessors to the Modern art era.
In 1990, only a year after the MoMA controversy, the Guggenheim Museum in
New York deaccessioned and auctioned at Sotheby’s three paintings from its collections:
Modigliani’s Boy in a Blue Vest (1918), Kandinsky’s Fugue (fig.III.4; 1914), and
Chagall’s Anniversaire (Fig. III.5; 1943). All together, the paintings sold at auction raised
$47.3 million. This amount was more than enough to cover the estimated price-tag of $24
million to $35 million being asked for the Panza Collection of American Minimalists
(example of a work from the collection: Fig. III.6).129 Thomas Krens, director of the
Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation and propagator of the sale, strongly regarded the
deaccessions and sales as a trade of old masterpieces for new. When controversy erupted
over the sales, Krens defended the museum’s actions, declaring, “I think the artists we’ve
acquired in the Panza collection will be among the most important artists of the 20th
century, if they are not already. I believe that half of what we acquired at the very least
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are masterpieces…I believe these are classical works of the 20th century, and they deal
with the fundamental issue of the 20th century, which is the notion of abstraction.”130
One of the major criticisms of the sale was that the Guggenheim sold works of
high quality and renown by early twentieth century masters, in order to purchase
Minimalist sculptures of the 1960s and 70s.131 Of especial distress was the sale of the
Kandinsky Fugue, considered by many to be a centerpiece of the Guggenheim’s
collection.132 This “dumping of treasures” at auction drew disapproval even from Kirk
Varnedoe, the curator who advocated the MoMA deaccessions. He is quoted as
commenting that the Guggenheim sale “set a dangerous precedent.”133 Diane Waldman,
the deputy director of the Guggenheim, admitted the outstanding nature of the
deaccessioned works. Yet she defended the museum’s actions, stating that they still
owned “an outstanding group” of Kandinskys from the same period as the one auctioned,
while the acquisition of the “extraordinary” Panza Collection filled in an art historical
hole in the Guggenheim’s contemporary collection.134 Like the administrators of the
Walker Art Center and the MoMA, the Guggenheim saw the opportunity for the
strengthening of its collections, but could only do so by sacrificing works that would
unquestionably bring high prices at auction.
In each case, the furor was a response to the decisions to sell the art; many in the
art world believed that museum administrators were “cashing in”,135 and setting “a
dangerous precedent.”136 The journalist/critic Philip Weiss epitomized the sentiment
many felt about this perceived glut of deaccessioning. In the July 1990 issue of Art in
America, he scornfully wrote “...the museum community’s crisis results from the freemarket spirit of the 1980s. The notion of the museum as a guardian of the public
patrimony has given way to the notion of a museum as a corporate entity with a highly
marketable inventory and the desire for growth.”137
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the sales. Clearly, people felt strongly about museums selling works of art, rather than
preserving them for the greater good
The common thread which runs through all of these narratives is the conflict
between a public presuming that art museums should never alter their collections, even if
it meant retaining the dusty paintings languishing in a moldy corner of a museum
basement, and the museum professionals overseeing living, changing organisms
operating in an increasingly competitive environment. Essentially, by cutting public
funding, the Reagan administration created the need for museums to find better methods
to attract audiences. As one of the most visible aspects of an art museum, collections
offered one way to do this. Either an art museum could change its mission and collections
so as not to compete with a similar institution in the same geographic region, or it could
increase its distinct brand identity by purchasing better artworks. Yet because of the art
market of the 1980s, art museums were often forced to deaccession and sell paintings of
high quality in order to purchase works they felt necessary to the continuing lives of their
institutions. As Thomas Messer, ex-director of the Guggenheim frankly put it, “…for a
museum to be alive, ‘it must not only feed itself, it must excrete.’”138

138

Ibid. 131.

37

Figures

Figure III.1 Advertisement from ARTnews, Jan. 1981, v. 81

Figure III.2 Vincent van Gogh,
Portrait of Joseph Roulin, 1889,
Oil on canvas,
Museum of Modern Art, New York.

Fig. III.3 Pierre-Auguste Renoir,
Reclining Nude, 1902,
Oil on canvas,
Formerly owned by the Museum of Modern Art
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Figure III.4 Wassily Kandinsky,
Fugue, 1914,
Oil on canvas,
Formerly owned by the Solomon R
Guggenheim Museum, New York.

Figure III.5 Marc Chagall,
Anniversaire, 1923,
Oil on canvas,
Formerly owned by the Solomon R.
Guggenheim Museum, New York.

Figure III.6 Brice Marden,
D’Après la Marquise de la Solana, 1969,
Oil and wax on canvas,
Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York.
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V. Implications: The Museum Community Reacts
The controversial deaccessions that took place in the late 1980s and 1990s had farreaching effects for the professional art museum field. No matter the reasons used to
justify the actions of the Walker Art Center, MoMA, the Guggenheim, and other art
museums that chose to deaccession, the museum field recognized that deaccessioning is
almost always seen by the public as inexcusable. Museum professionals gradually began
to appreciate the wisdom behind Louis J. Lefkowitz’s 1973 recommendation of
establishing self-regulating guidelines for deaccessioning. Already in the 1980s, art
museums were considering their collections in a new light due to the financial hardships
caused by the Reagan administration and the art market boom. Consequently, the
museum community commenced to more systematically examine their collections.
Rather than maintaining everything in a collection, objects were now being measured by
their usefulness to a museum through the vehicle of collections policies. Later, with the
spate of deaccessions during the late 1980s and 1990s again bringing up questions of the
public trust held by art museums, these collection policies were increasingly adapted in
order to deflect legal action and criticism, as well as regulate why, when, and how
museums deaccessioned.
Collections Management Policies Help Museums Financially & Ethically
Beginning in the early 1980s, the costs of caring for artworks in collections were being
more systematically considered by American art museums. This was in part spurred by a
1983 study conducted by the architect George Hartman of the Washington-based firm
Hartman-Cox. Hartman developed a series of formulas that made it possible to calculate
the costs associated with the care and storage per object in a museum’s collection. His
findings revealed that expenditure for the “specific costs of such elements as
accessioning,

cataloguing,

periodic

inventory,

maintaining

accessible

records,

environment and pest control, storage hardware, security, conservation, insurance, and
general overhead including management and building expense,” amounted to an average
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of $50 a year per object.139 Using the consumer price index to adjust for the intervening
inflation, this figure translates in 2006 to a little over $100 per object.
As a result of the realization of the costs incurred while caring for collections,
they began to be viewed, at least by the museum community, on a more practical and
economic level than ever before. To aid in more systematic collections management, art
museums in the 1980s and 1990s increasingly developed and implemented collections
management policies. A collections management policy, or collections policy, is “a
written document, approved by the governing authority [of a museum], that specifies the
museum’s policies concerning all collections-related issues, including accessioning,
documentation, storage, and disposition.”140 A collections policy provides specific
guidelines for accessioning and deaccessioning, usually based on documentation,
ownership, authenticity, and condition of an object. In addition, a collections policy can
outline the scope of a collection, stipulating the subject, geographical location, and time
period on which a collection focuses.141 One of its fundamental intents is to ensure that
the objects a museum holds are appropriate to and advance its mission and are properly
cared for and documented.142
To encourage museums to execute collections policies, in 1984 the AAM began
requiring a written collections management policy to be in place for any museum seeking
accreditation or reaccreditation.143 To be accredited by AAM means a museum has
received the organization’s “seal of approval,” and that a museum is committed to
“excellence, accountability, high professional standards, and continued institutional
improvement.”144 Museums desiring to be accredited often follow AAM-approved
policies, including their code of ethics regarding collections (See Appendix 1). AAM
code of ethics suggests a reciprocal relationship between a museum and its objects.
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Stating that a museum should only own what supports its mission, the code also stipulates
a museum should properly care for and protect those objects.145 In this way, only objects
which further the goals of a museum are retained, which makes for a more focused and
economically-smart collection. Those that do not fit these conditions can therefore be
deaccessioned. By requiring that museums have collections policies, AAM ensures that
objects that are irrelevant to a museum and its mission can be recognized and properly
deaccessioned.
Over and above the advantage of being able to analytically approach a collection,
AAM recognized that by requiring collections policies, it could prevent museums from
deaccessioning for reasons other than those approved by the museum community in
general. An example of this comes from University of Kentucky Art Museum
(UKAM).146 Its deaccessioning policy reflects the code of ethics promulgated by AAM
(See Appendix 2). UKAM’s criteria for deaccessioning revolves around whether or not
an object is “relevant and useful to the purposes and activities of the Art Museum and if
they can be properly stored, preserved, and used.”147 Additionally, UKAM will
deaccession objects that are too deteriorated to be displayed, are similar to other objects
within the collection, are beyond the museum’s capability to care for or store, or are
outside the museum’s collecting scope.148 For no other reasons than these does UKAM
find it proper to deaccession. This is essentially a reversal of AAM’s stipulation that only
objects advancing a museum’s mission, and can be properly cared for, should be retained.
If these conditions cannot be met, UKAM will deaccession.
In addition to criteria for deaccessioning, deaccessioning policies provide
procedures outlining a course of action an art museum should follow when contemplating
and carrying out a decision. Procedures often differ depending on the individual structure
of an art museum. Nonetheless, according to the 1997 “Report to the Deaccessioning
Task Force,” there are general characteristics among these different deaccessioning
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processes that can be identified.149 Within their procedural guidelines, many art museums
specify that either the curator responsible for the objects, the collections management
teams, or the registrar recommend an object for deaccessioning. Once an object has been
recommended to a governing board, a written document is often required describing the
reason for deaccessioning, the donor, the object’s history and provenance, its
significance, physical condition, an appraisal, a proposed method of disposal, and a
request for a photograph of the object. Art museums will also seek independent appraisals
to establish market value, as well as expert opinions. Questions of legal requirements,
title, and donor-imposed restrictions are also to be answered at this time. Donors are
almost always notified, or their heirs, about the pending deaccession and the original
donor’s name will be attached to any purchases made with funds raised from the sale of
the deaccessioned object. Once an object has been deaccessioned, all information on it is
kept in a permanent file.150
By following these procedures when deaccessioning, art museums can try to
ensure that they are fully aware of their actions, and that no rushed judgments are made
during the process. Likewise, written documentation of actions taken while
deaccessioning can supply proof to the public that a museum has gone through careful
considerations. These are both possible reasons as to why AAM began requiring written
collections policies beginning in 1984. By having these in place, museum staffs and
boards have concrete guidelines of approved collection practices that they can follow,
which also act as physical evidence in the event of public disclosure of a deaccession.151
The success of collections policies in deflecting criticism can be questioned. As
seen by the examples of the high-profile deaccessions undertaken by the Walker Art
Center, MoMA, and the Guggenheim, even when documentation and justifications were
produced by the museums, many were still not satisfied. This was in part because many
critics saw the deaccessions and sales as part of an increasingly worrisome trend of art
museums viewing their collections as a kind of investment that could be tapped whenever
a curator or director saw fit. Tom Freudenheim, assistant secretary of museums at the
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Smithsonian Institution in 1990 echoed these concerns in an ARTnews interview, stating
that museums “see themselves no longer as custodians of culture but as institutions that
hold lots of things that are assets and have monetary value.”152 Although this extreme
view is also up to debate, the museum community became sufficiently worried that a
discussion commenced over how funds from deaccessioning proceeds could be spent.
Particularly when many art museums in America were struggling financially, it was
feared that in addition to selling works in order to buy, museums might also perceive
their collections as a cash reserve that could be used to pay for operating expenses.
Several art museums had indeed either tried to sell works or sold works for purposes
other than the replenishment of collections. In 1981, Harvard proposed deaccessioning
works of art from the Fogg Art Museum in order to raise operating funds for what was to
be a new wing for the museum. Harvard ultimately decided against the deaccessions after
being threatened with a formal condemnation by the museum community.153 Several
years later, in 1987, the Phillips Collection in Washington, D.C. deaccessioned and sold
at auction for $3 million Le Violin by Georges Braque. The proceeds were originally to
go into the Phillip’s general endowment fund, but the institution later agreed to use the
funds for future acquisitions, with any income pending such use being applied
exclusively to the care and maintenance of the permanent collection.154
Both Harvard and the Phillips Collection were dissuaded from using funds from
deaccessions for operating expenses by the disapproval voiced by the museum
community and the public. Their examples, among others, made it clear that ethical codes
recommending the use of deaccessioning proceeds needed to be established.155 As a
result, in 1991 and 1994, the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) and AAM
established in their collections codes stipulations restricting the use of monies raised
through the deaccession of artworks.156 In its “Professional Practices in Art Museum”,
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AAMD states that “Deaccessioning and disposal by sale shall not serve to provide
operating funds, and the proceeds from disposal must be treated as acquisition funds.”157
The AAMD wants profits from sales of deaccessioned items only to be returned in the
form of another art object, disallowing funds to be used for any other purposes. In a
similar vein, the new collections code of ethics adopted by AAM in 1994 contains a
clause stating: “disposal of collections through sale, trade, or research activities is solely
for the advancement of the museum’s mission. Proceeds from the sale of nonliving
collections are to be used consistent with the established standards of the museum’s
discipline, but in no event shall they be used for anything other than acquisition or direct
care of collections.”158 Although the wording of this code leaves some room for
interpretation, AAM also requires that proceeds generated by deaccessions should be
limited to enhancing the collection. Its stance is somewhat different from AAMD,
because the clause “direct care of collections” allows income from deaccessioned objects
to be used for the conservation and preservation of a collection, in addition to
acquisition.159 By restricting deaccessioning to the two purposes of replenishment and
care of objects, AAMD and AAM hope to prevent art museums from deaccessioning for
reasons other than to improve their collections.
In order to be recognized as an art museum of high quality and standards, most
American art museums that have collections and deaccession policies in place abide by
the rules of AAMD and AAM. As Marie C. Malaro, a lawyer specializing in museum
law, points out, “…an ethical code sets forth conduct that a profession considers essential
in order to uphold the integrity of the profession.”160 If an art museum designs its
collections and deaccession policies according to the professionally accepted code of
ethics of these two organizations, and upholds them, it will hopefully be less likely to
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make poor decisions when deaccessioning and subsequently avoid upsetting the public on
which it relies for support.
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VI. Conclusion
Since their beginning, American museums in general and American art museums in
particular have shown a chameleon-like ability to change and adapt according to shifts
and changes in their environment. One result of this adaptability is that objects in art
museum collections are not as permanent as those outside the museum field still tend to
believe. This became especially evident at the end of the twentieth century, when art
museums sold important works from their collections in order to compete in a new
economic climate. These deaccessions upset many people outside the museum
community and some inside it as well. The development of collections management
policies in the 1980s could be seen as a defensive response by the museum community to
the ensuing uproar. Collections management policies ostensibly prevented museums from
engaging in questionable practices that could cause them to run afoul of the public trust.
Yet by requiring museums to have written rules for collections and deaccessioning, the
professional museum organizations, such as AAM and AAMD clearly do not discourage
deaccessioning as a practice. In fact, the very existence of established policies confirmed
deaccessioning as a standard, if not always openly advertised as such, practice. Indeed,
the “Professional Practices in Art Museums,” published by AAMD, states that
deaccessioning and disposal is “a legitimate part of the formation and care of collections
and, if practiced, should be intended to refine and improve the quality and
appropriateness of the collections.”161 Deaccessioning is no longer considered an
exception; it is now the rule, at least for many within the museum community.
Nonetheless, for many outside the museum profession, an art museum is still
viewed as “…a permanent repository, a great barrel of amber in which things—once
dropped—will be forever preserved.”162 The prevalence of this perception is confirmed
by the outcry almost always generated whenever an art museum deaccessions and
disposes what are perceived to be important objects at auction. A very recent example of
this comes from the deaccessions and sales undertaken by the Albright-Knox Art Gallery
in Buffalo, New York. In March 2007, the New York Times reported that the planned
deaccessions and sales of the museum’s collection of antiquities, medieval, and
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Renaissance art was causing much controversy in the Buffalo area.163 The board and
director of the Albright-Knox had decided in November to sell works to add to the
museum’s acquisitions fund, in order to purchase Modern and contemporary artworks.
The mission of the museum has long focused on Modern and contemporary art, and
according to Charles W. Banta, the president of the board, the older pieces were bought
in the 1930s during a time of “severe mission drift.”164 Opponents of the deaccessions,
however, contended that the museum was misrepresenting its historical focus on Modern
and contemporary art. Action was taken to prevent the deaccessions from going forward,
including a lawsuit. The lawsuit was later thrown out by a New York State Supreme
Court judge, on the basis that the museum was not in fact deviating from its mission.165
As a result of the judge’s decision, the deaccessions continued. Later in March 2007, the
first sale of antiquities at Sotheby’s in Manhattan brought $18 million.166
The case of the Albright-Knox sales reveal a gap in perception between how the
public believes art museums function, and how art museums actually function. For a
small museum like the Albright-Knox to compete in a market in which prices reach
above several million dollars for a single Modern or contemporary artwork, it is
impossible to expect it to not take measures such as deaccessioning of artworks to ensure
their competitiveness. Indeed, given the museum’s mission statement directed focus,
holding onto artworks that do not fit its purview makes little sense. Perhaps, most
significantly, the professional standards set up by the oversight organizations, AAM and
AAMD, would actually discourage the museum from doing so. And yet, this aspect of
museum practice clearly has not registered with those outside the professional museum
field, who still believe the Albright-Knox is supposed to function as a “permanent
repository.” Perhaps to bridge this “perception gap,” art museums could openly
acknowledge that they do deaccession, and publicly announce in some way when they
plan to do so. Although controversy will inevitably ensue at first, a gradual change in
perception on the part of the public may occur. With time, it is possible a more balanced
and educated understanding of how art museums really operate will materialize.
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Appendix 1
American Association of Museums’ “Code of Ethics for Museums: Collections”
Excerpted from the American Association of Museum’s Code of Ethics for Museums (1994)

The distinctive character of museum ethics derives from the ownership, care, and use of
objects, specimens, and living collections representing the world’s natural and cultural
common wealth. This stewardship of collections entails the highest public trust and
carries with it the presumption of rightful ownership, permanence, care, documentation,
accessibility, and responsible disposal.
Thus, the museum ensures that:
• collections in its custody support its mission and public trust responsibilities
• collections in its custody are protected, secure, unencumbered, cared for, and
preserved
• collections in its custody are accounted for and documented
• access to the collections and related information is permitted and regulated
• acquisition, disposal, and loan activities are conducted in a manner that respects
the protection and preservation of natural and cultural resources and discourages
illicit trade in such materials
• disposal of collections through sale, trade, or research activities is solely for the
advancement of the museum’s mission. Proceeds from the sale of nonliving
collections are to be used consistent with the established standards of the
museum’s discipline, but in no event shall they be used for anything other than
acquisitions or direct care of collections
• the unique and special nature of human remains and funerary and sacred objects is
recognized as the basis of all decision concerning such collections
• collections-related activities promote the public good rather than individual
financial gain.
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Appendix 2
University of Kentucky Art Museum’s Policy for the Deaccession of Objects
A.

Definition:
Deaccessioning means only that an object or collection of objects is removed
from the collection. It does not mean sale, or gift, or exchange, etc., since such
judgments will be made only after the decision to deaccession.

B.

Criteria:
Objects in the collection should be retained permanently if they continue to be
relevant and useful to the purposes and activities of the Art Museum and if they
can be properly stored, preserved, and used. Deaccessioning of objects are
considered when these conditions no longer prevail. Deaccessioning or disposal
of objects by sale or trade is undertaken only when the objects are deemed by the
director, in consultation with the curator, registrar, and/or other consultants, to be
of a quality below the current standards of the Art Museum, closely parallel or are
similar to other objects in the collection, or clearly fall outside the capability of
the Art Museum to properly store or conserve. Deteriorated works should be
deaccessioned unless their quality after conservation would be acceptable. An
unexhibitable work might be retained as a study example of deterioration, but
deaccessioned from the collection. Items that are outside the scope of the Art
Museum, including any item whose lack of interest would preclude its public
exhibition, should be deaccessioned and either disposed of or inventoried with
educational, study, or other collections.

C.

Disclosure:
Recommendations for such deaccessioning are brought by the director before the
Art Museum Advisory Committee for its information and advice. The director
has the responsibilities of ensuring that there are no legal or other obstacles to the
disposal of objects in its possession and of informing the committee on these
matters. The University’s Board of Trustees must approve the decision to sell
deaccessioned objects.
Public disclosure should be considered upon the disposition of any important
item. In disposing of an object given by a living donor, reasonable effort must be
made to notify the donor of the Art Museum's intention. When there are items in
the possession of the museum the donors of which are unknown, which have
never been accessioned and do not merit accessioning, the director is authorized
to sell these objects and to place the proceeds in an acquisition fund.

D.

Records:
Records pertaining to deaccessioned objects are retained: curatorial files are kept
separate and organized by artist name; registration files are organized by
accession number.
(See Appendix X.)
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Appendix 2 Continued
E.

Disposal:
Public auction is the preferred method of disposal of any important item.
Exchange with a public museum might be contemplated. Trades should be
undertaken only with a sure knowledge of the attendant values and advantages.
Private sale to Art Museum staff or members of the Art Museum Advisory
Committee or to their representatives is not allowed. If an object is to be
deaccessioned because it is outside the scope of the Art Museum but it has
historical or other value, preference should be given to another museum. No part
of the collection will be removed for gifts.

F.

Income:
Funds received from the sale of objects from the collection are to be used only to
benefit the collection and all proceeds are to be placed in an Art Museum
acquisition fund. No proceeds from deaccessioned materials may be used for
operating expenses, but must be directed back into the collection.
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